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Eritrea and the Migration Dilemma in the Horn of Africa
Abstract:
The state of Eritrea is gradually losing its population. A variety of human rights violations
including mandatory indefinite conscription is contributing to many Eritrean citizens’ choice to
flee. Those that do flee, tend to go to Sudan or Ethiopia as there is a long historical and cultural
connection between the three countries. Additionally, Sudan and Ethiopia have a variety of laws
and institutions in place to help the various refugees they take in. However, despite this
legislation, refugees are still vulnerable members of the population who face many troubles. This
shared history, culture and the legal protections afforded to refugees, are some of the reasons
why Eritreans choose to flee to Sudan or Ethiopia. Some refugees use Sudan and Ethiopia as a
stepping stone on the way to Europe, since this shared culture and history provides them with a
taste of home while attempting to flee to a better life and the protection afforded by legal
institutions whether they choose Sudan or Ethiopia or continue on their journey to Europe
Understanding the Exodus of Eritreans
Eritrea is quickly becoming a nation with no people. Around 12% of the Eritrean
population is a refugee or asylum seeker (Eritrea: Events of 2016). They are fleeing from their
own country, headed by President Isaias Afwerki, who stands accused by the United Nations of
crimes against humanity, including mandatory indefinite military conscription that some argue
amounts to slavery (Stevis and Parkinson). Due to these allegations, Eritrean refugees have
prima facie designation status, meaning those fleeing from Eritrea are assumed to have valid
asylum claims (Laub). Eritreans face many push factors that force them to leave Eritrea and
pursue a better life in Sudan or Ethiopia. This is compounded by the fact that Eritrea, Ethiopia
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and Sudan have a long-shared history and many cultural ties, which affects life in refugee camps
located there. In addition, laws passed by Sudan and Ethiopia are meant to ensure the protection
of these refugees. Life in the camps is, however, far from good. This paper serves to analyze why
Eritreans are fleeing their country and why they still choose to go to and sometimes permanently
stay in Ethiopia and Sudan.
To provide context for why individuals are choosing to leave Eritrea, it is important to
understand the human rights violations perpetuated by the government of Eritrea. Then the
history of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan will be explored to show its role in the creation of the
refugee communities in Ethiopia and Sudan and to show the historical connection between these
three nations in the Horn of Africa. The cultural ties between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan,
another pull factor for Eritreans fleeing to Sudan and Ethiopia, can explain why Eritreans would
feel comfortable in those neighboring countries. Finally, there will be a short introduction of the
various refugee camps in both Ethiopia and Sudan and some of the problems refugees face. This
historical and legal perspective will offer insights into why Eritrean refugees are fleeing, the
legal protections they are apparently guaranteed and the problems they face after they have fled
their home country.
Human Rights Violations
Eritrea is currently tied for third place, along with North Korea, as one of the worst
nations in the world for not protecting the freedom of its citizens (Aghekyan et al). The Eritrean
government forces its people into indefinite military service (Freedom in the World 2018: Eritrea
2017; Alfred). In addition, Eritreans are subjected to disappearances and arbitrary detention
without a trial (Freedom in the World 2018: Eritrea 2017; Alfred). Mandatory conscription
started in 1995 with the Proclamation of National Service which mandated that men and women

https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/irj/vol5/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25035/irj.05.01.03

Stark: Eritrea and the Migration Dilemma in the Horn of Africa

between the ages of 18 to 50 would serve for 18 months in military, government, civil service or
administrative positions (Plaut 150-1). Conscription is indefinite, and the wages they are paid for
their conscription are not enough to live on (Plaut 151). Additionally, women often face sexual
abuse and assault by military officials (Plaut 151-2). According to a former military teacher,
“sexuelle Gewalt in Sawa [sei] geradezu «normal»”, that is sexual assault is considered to be
normal in the main military training camp (Swiss Refugee Council 13). It should be noted:
women are partially exempt from the mandatory national conscription (Swiss Refugee Council
11). Women who have children or are married are partially exempt from serving so many girls
stop going to school early to get married and have children to avoid conscription (Swiss Refuge
Council 11). Nonetheless, there are still gender related consequences to this situation. Women
are not the only vulnerable population affected by mandatory conscription. For those with
medical conditions, exemption is almost impossible to receive (Swiss Refuge Council 14). Even
those who are injured are forced to serve even if they were previously deemed unfit to serve
(Swiss Refugee Council 14). Eritrea issued the Warsay Yikealo Development Campaign, also
known as “Eritrea’s Marshall Plan”, which came into place in 2000 after the border war with
Ethiopia (Swiss Refugee Council 8). This program is both a conscription requirement and a
development program enforced by the Eritrean government (Swiss Refugee Council 8).
Additionally, Eritrea is known to impose extreme restrictions on freedom of speech,
association and expression (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). The only media present in Eritrea is state
owned (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). In 2001, Eritrea closed all independent news sources and jailed
all journalists (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). No journalists have been to trial and instead are
detained in solitary confinement (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). It is also believed, according to their
prison guards, that half of these journalists died in prison (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). Moreover,
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Eritrea only recognizes four religions and it is believed that at least 3,000 people are in prison for
following an unrecognized religion (Alfred). Additionally, Eritrea has jailed over 10,000 political
prisoners (Alfred). For those who try to leave Eritrea, they must worry about repercussions faced
by the family they left behind. “This physical trauma was experienced during a period of
imprisonment because of being either politically or religiously different from what the
government thinks is their own or because of a family member fleeing the country” (Arega 99)1.
Due to the targeting of family members, women and children are then forced to flee and then
may face hardship (Arega 99).
Eritrea’s governing structure also contributes to the human rights abuses. Eritrea has a
constitution which was ratified in 1997 but not implemented (The World Factbook: Eritrea.). A
new constitution has been created and is still being worked on to this day (The World Factbook:
Eritrea.). Presidential elections are supposed to be held every five years with the president
holding office for two terms, but the only election was held in 1993, leading to the election of
Isaias Afwerki. From then on, elections were indefinitely postponed (The World Factbook:
Eritrea.). Eritrea has not had a legislature since 2002 (Eritrea: Events of 2016.). There is only one
political party allowed in Eritrea, which is the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (The
World Factbook: Eritrea.). These repressive governmental institutions lead to a variety of human
rights abuses which cause many Eritreans to flee.
What does the Eritrean government think about this exodus of people fleeing? The
Eritrean government has issued a scathing response to allegations that its citizens are fleeing
their country. On their Ministry of Information website, they allege that the United Nations is

To read more see Natnael Terefe Arega’d article, “The Plights of Eritrean Refugees in the Shimelba Refugee Camp, Ethiopia.”
Located in the International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care, vol. 13, no. 1, 2017, pp. 93–105.,
doi:10.1108/ijmhsc-02-2016-0007.
1
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fraudulently adding over 185,000-210,000 to the actual refugee figures (Sewra). They claim that
the figures presented are subject to politicization and that the United States, Europe and Israel are
waging a “human trafficking scheme designed to weaken and destabilize the country” (Sewra).
The article that was published by the Danish Immigration Report that the Eritrean government
cites to justify its belief that the UN has fraudulent figures on Eritrean refugees has been derided
by academics and human rights activists (Plaut 92). While the Eritrean government issues these
statements, it is important to take into consideration that there are a variety of other sources
indicated above that give details on the human rights abuses that are taking place in Eritrea and
explain why Eritreans are fleeing. Let us now turn to the question where they are choosing to go.
Many Eritrean refugees have headed to Europe. Eritrea is on the list of the top ten
countries that refugees attempting to get to Europe are coming from (Plaut 92). However, with
attitudes towards refugees changing in Europe, governments have begun to argue that the human
rights situation in Eritrea is not as bad as it once was; this is a disguised attempt to justify that
they do not have to accept Eritrean asylum seekers (Plaut 92). Some European countries have
caught ahold of the Danish Immigration Report, and even though it has been denounced by two
of the three authors and the Danish Immigration Service decided not to use the report, it inspired
other European countries to alter their information on the human rights situation in Eritrea (Plaut
92-93). This has allowed European regimes to become more selective when accepting Eritrean
asylum seekers (Plaut 93). In fact, refugees have gone to Sudan and Ethiopia, both of which
border Eritrea. There are reported to be a combined total of around a quarter of a million Eritrean
refugees in Sudan and Ethiopia (Laub). Additionally, the border between Eritrea and Sudan is
easy to cross as it is not well defended due to its size (Johnson 1). Refugees also choose to
migrate to Sudan because they view Sudan as being a transit destination (Johnson 1). They feel it
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is easier to get to Europe, the United States, or other countries from Sudan, so it is merely a stop
on their journey (Johnson 1).
While Europe accommodates tens of thousands of Eritreans, there are around 250,000
Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia and Sudan (Laub). However, it is important to understand that there
could be more refugees as some may not register as refugees or asylum seekers. Eritrea has a
complicated history with Sudan and Ethiopia, and this history begs the question of how their
shared past and foreign policy impacts the Eritrean diaspora in each of these countries. The most
obvious answer is that the border tensions with Ethiopia are one of the justifications Eritrea gives
for mandatory conscriptions (Alfred). The Eritrean government argues that Eritrea is still at war
with Ethiopia due to the latter occupying territory that belongs to Eritrea (Stevis and Parkinson).
Ethiopia denies this charge (Stevis and Parkinson). While many Eritreans are going to Europe,
there is a great number of refugees still within the Horn of Africa. Although Europe and the US
are showcased in the media as favorite destinations for migration, it is important to recognize the
significant number of refugees in this region. A brief look at the history of the region will help to
shed light on this East African refugee crisis.
History of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan
Background of the Conflict
Eritrea was once a part of Ethiopia. In 1889, Ethiopian Emperor Menelik traded what is
now Eritrea to the Italians in return for supporting his claim to the throne (Kuhlman 34). Italy
believed that it would be possible to capture the rest of Ethiopia and so it “supported” Emperor
Menelik’s claim to the throne and then attempted to capture Ethiopia (Kuhlman 34). This did not
happen. Ethiopia was able to fend off the Italians, resulting in Eritrea being colonized while
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Ethiopia retained its independence (Kuhlman 34). This started the process of Eritrea and Ethiopia
becoming separate entities (Kuhlman 34). In 1896, Ethiopia forced the Italians to sign treaties
that created a border between the Italian colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia, although during World
War II, Ethiopia was controlled by Italy (Plaut 9). At the end of World War II, the British took
possession of both Eritrea and Ethiopia (Kuhlman 34). The British reestablished the Ethiopian
monarchy but kept Eritrea under their control (Kuhlman 34).
However, this all changed in 1952. The United Nations determined that Eritrea would
become an autonomous region within Ethiopia (The World Factbook: Eritrea.). In response to
this ruling, Ethiopia began violating Eritrean rights including: rigging elections; abolishing the
official languages of Eritrea, Tigrinya, Arabic as well as Tigre, and infringing on the rights of
freedom of speech and movement (Kuhlman 35-6; Plaut 11). There were additional religious
tensions that occurred, which also served to cause unrest and fear about the individual groups
and their ability to control one another. The future Christian majority that would be created when
Ethiopia and Eritrea were unified worried the Muslim minority, although there were also those
Christian and Muslims that went against their own groups’ interests, favoring independence for
their own personal reasons (Kuhlman 35). These factors, combined with other nations interfering
to ensure their interests were protected, eventually led to a civil war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
(Kuhlmann 35).
The Civil War
Starting in September 1961, the civil war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out (Plaut
11). In response to the civil war, Ethiopia absorbed Eritrea, ending the latter’s status as an
autonomous region (Plaut 11). The main resistance group, composed mainly of Muslims, called
itself the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (Plaut 11-12). The ELF was discriminatory towards
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Christians who wanted to join the movement; this discrimination resulted in the creation of
another resistance group, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which claimed to be
secular but was dominated by the Christians (Plaut 12). The groups began to fight for control,
which the EPLF ultimately won (Plaut 12). The largely Muslim ELF chose to move operate out
of Sudan (Plaut 12).
In addition to the Eritrean problem, Ethiopia was also facing another uprising in the
Tigray region of its territory (Plaut 12). While the two groups leading the Tigray Revolution and
the EPLF were ideologically and politically different, they cooperated with one another, which
led to military successes (Plaut 21-22). Eventually, the EPLF took the capital of Eritrea, Asmara,
while the Tigray People’s Liberation Movement took control of Ethiopia and overthrew the Derg
in 1991 (Plaut 22). Due to the existing relationship between the resistance movements, foreign
relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia were good (Plaut 22). Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to free
movement between their people, a common currency and trade of Ethiopian goods in Eritrea
(Plaut 22). Eritrea held a referendum and declared its independence which was supported by the
new Ethiopian regime (Plaut 22). The president of Eritrea became Isaias Afwerki and he has
remained in power since Eritrea became an independent country on May 24, 1991 (The World
Factbook: Eritrea.). Despite the initial goodwill that prevailed between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
there is, however, still conflict over border disputes today (The World Factbook: Eritrea.). The
Eritrean War of independence set off the flow of refugees out of Eritrea and into Ethiopia and
Sudan which has continued ever since and has contributed to the building of communities and
the start of the conflicted ties between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan.
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Regional Dynamics: Eritrea; Sudan and Ethiopia before Eritrean Independence
To complicate matters in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea and Sudan have both played active
roles in each other’s foreign policy. Sudan frequently used Eritrea as a chess piece to advance its
foreign policy, but conversely, was also vital to the Eritrean independence movement (Plaut 74).
During the creation of the Eritrean state, many Eritrean nationalists and political activists fled to
Sudan with the numerous other citizens who fled from cities due to unemployment (Reid 73).
However, Sudanese foreign policy towards Eritrean refugees was not positive. At first, Sudan’s
President Aboud worked closely with Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie against Eritrea (Reid
74-75). This ensured that Ethiopia would not intervene in the uprisings in southern Sudan (Reid
74-75). However, this all changed when President Aboud was overthrown in 1964 and replaced
by Ismail Al-Ashari until 1969 (Reid 75).
The Al-Ashari government of Sudan began supporting many other liberation movements,
including the Eritrean refugee community in Sudan (Reid 75). They even allowed the ELF to
receive arms from Syria and gave them free movement throughout Sudan (Reid 75). In response,
the Ethiopian government decided to step up attacks on Sudanese villages on its border and
began aiding the southern Sudanese rebels (Reid 76).
The situation between Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia again shifted when the Sudanese
regime changed in 1969 (Reid 76). The new Sudanese government, headed by Gaafar Nimeiry,
came to an agreement with the Ethiopian government where neither government would allow
weapons to reach rebel groups; each government agreed to remove any refugees involved in
“subversive activities” and to close rebel training centers within their respective countries (Reid
76). This change in relations did not last however, and soon Ethiopia and Sudan were on the
verge of war which was narrowly averted (Reid 76-77).
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Sudanese and Ethiopian relations managed to improve when the Addis Ababa Agreement
came to fruition in 1972 (Reid 77). This agreement ended the civil war in southern Sudan and
also ended Sudan’s active support of the Eritrean refugee community (Reid 77). The border
between Eritrea and Sudan closed, and Sudan began trying to stop weapons from reaching the
Eritreans (Reid 77). In 1973, however, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was overthrown,
and the new rulers of Ethiopia, the Derg, launched a full-scale attack on the capital of Eritrea
(Reid 78). This caused millions of Eritreans to flee to Sudan (Reid 78). In response to this, Sudan
sanctioned the ELF to operate out of Sudan and allowed shipments of supplies from Cuba to help
the Eritreans (Reid 78). Essentially, the foreign policy between Eritrea, Sudan and, peripherally,
Ethiopia could be understood as explained by Martin Plaut, “The degree of freedom of action for
Eritrean organisations operating in Sudan became a barometer of the Sudanese relationship with
Ethiopia” (Plaut 75).
Eventually, Ethiopia chose to resume diplomatic relations with Eritrea, albeit
unsuccessfully. They sent a representative who had ties to both Eritrea and Ethiopia to try to
ensure the success of reestablishing ties (Reid 79). To end the Eritrean war of independence,
Ethiopia sent a treaty to Sudan called the Nine Point Programme, which the Eritreans rejected in
1976 (Plaut 76). The Nine Point Program or the Nine Point Peace Plan was a treaty written by
Ethiopia in an attempt the end the Eritrean War of Independence but failed to recognize many of
the demands of the Eritreans groups fighting for liberation (Clapham 208). The treaty would not
acknowledge an independent Eritrea and instead wanted Eritrea to unify with Ethiopia (Clapham
208). This treaty would not give concrete border limitations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and
instead offered to allow the EPLF to “participate in in building an Ethiopian national revolution”
(Clapham 208). The Eritreans could not accept this treaty as Ethiopia was not attempting to
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recognize them as an independent state which is what the EPLF and the ELP were fighting for
(Clapham 208). During this time, the Sudanese government suffered a failed coup and blamed
Ethiopia (Plaut 76). In retaliation, Sudan threatened to raise an army of Ethiopian and Eritrean
refugees living in Sudan in order to invade Ethiopia and overthrow the Ethiopian government
(Plaut 76). This did not come to pass, but it shows the interconnected tensions between Sudan,
Eritrea and Ethiopia, since Sudan was using Eritrea as a bargaining chip against Ethiopia. Once
Sudan and Ethiopia’s relationship began to improve, that resulted in Sudan completely changing
its policy on Eritrean refugees (Reid 80). Sudan announced the only solution to the Eritrean issue
was to unite them with Ethiopia (Reid 80). Eventually, the Sudanese regime of Nimeiry was
overthrown and a new regime under Ahmed al-Mirghani came to power in 1986, but this regime
change did not alter the Sudanese position on Eritrean refugees (Reid 81). The anti-Eritrean
refugee sentiment actually increased massively during this time and could even be seen in
Sudan’s mass media (Reid 81).
Then came the 1989 coup in Sudan which brought Omar al-Bashir to power. During this
time, the relationship between Eritrea and Sudan became belligerent (Reid 83). This was due in
part to Eritrea espousing the separation of religion and politics, Isaias Afwerki declared, “In
order to safeguard Eritrea’s national unity and Eritrean political independence…parties should
not be founded on a religious, ethnic, racial or tribal basis” (Reid 83). Additionally, Eritrea felt
Sudan was trying to destabilize them by supporting Eritrean extremist groups (Reid 84). Eritrea
in fact sent a memorandum to the United Nations claiming Sudan was supporting extremist
groups and helping them to pervade the Eritrean border (Reid 84). This was confirmed by Jamal
Ahmed el-Fadl, who was a member of al-Qaeda (Reid 88). While Sudan was hosting al-Qaeda,
they donated $100,000 to improve Islamic extremist military activity against Eritrea (Reid 88).
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Eventually, Eritrea chose to end diplomatic ties with Sudan due to the heighted tensions (Reid
85). Eritrean, Ethiopian and Sudanese relations during this time show the volatility present in the
Horn of Africa. Even before Eritrea became an independent nation, Ethiopia and Sudan were
doing what they could to ensure their political and regional interests would be met and even
when Eritrean independence was attained, this activity did not stop.
Eritrean Independence
Eritrea declared its independence from Ethiopia in 1991, but independence was not
officially recognized until 1993 (Plaut 27). Even though the initial relationship between Eritrea
and Ethiopia in the early 1990s was good, it did not last long. After Eritrean independence, the
members of the Eritrean government forced Ethiopian administrators and military members to
return to Ethiopia (Plaut 25). As a result, 120,000 Ethiopians were forced to leave Eritrea (Plaut
25). An Ethiopian forced to leave had this to say, “‘The Eritrean soldiers told us we were
strangers. But I was born in Eritrea like everyone else in my family’” (Plaut 26). Many of those
forced to leave were Eritrean women and children due to their marriage or relations with
Ethiopians (Plaut 26). Labelled collaborators, they were viewed as traitors (Plaut 26).
This devolution between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not just apparent between one
government to a group of people, it was also apparent in government to government relations.
The communications between Eritrea and Ethiopia proved cause for conflict. Eritrea and
Ethiopia did not establish an official interstate communications network (Plaut 26). Instead,
communications took place between people relying on personal relationships which made
communications highly volatile (Plaut 26). Relations further deteriorated as disputes over the
shared border began to erupt (Plaut 27). Relations continued to decline when Eritrea introduced
its own currency fueling a trade dispute (Plaut 30). Eritrea instituted a partial trade embargo until
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border conflicts erupted into a border war, causing Ethiopia to stop trade completely (Plaut 31).
In 1998, there was a border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut 33-34). Over 100,000 were
killed, and millions of civilians were forced to flee (Plaut 34). The two-year war ended in 2000,
but over 1/3 of the Eritrean population was forced to flee from their homes (Plaut 39).
Additionally, during the war Ethiopia removed any Eritrean civilians living within their borders
(Plaut 40). If they possessed Ethiopian citizenship, it was revoked, families were separated, and
around 75,000 people who had never been to Eritrea, were forced from their homes and sent to
their “home country” of Eritrea (Plaut 40). Eritrea, at first, said they would not send Ethiopians
living in Eritrea back to Ethiopia but this policy changed as the war continued (Plaut 40).
Eventually, Eritrea pursued a policy of repatriation that continued even after peace was attained
(Plaut 40). Ethiopia and Eritrea had a border war that ended in 2000, but the border that was
decided was never officially implemented (Plaut 151). As a result, Eritrea felt as if they must
constantly be ready for war.
While the border war was ongoing with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s ties with Sudan continued to
be destabilized. Eritrea realized that an effective way to strike back at Sudan for its attempt to
destabilize the Eritrean regime was to set up training camps for groups opposed the government
in Sudan (Reid 89). Thus, they began actively supporting anyone working to undermine the
Sudanese regime (Reid 89). Ethiopia, an ally of Eritrea at the time, alongside Eritrea, Uganda
and the United States began actively attacking and helping the Sudanese opposition take territory
in Sudan (Reid 90). This failed due to Ethiopia and Eritrea launching the border war, causing
Ethiopia to switch its allegiance to Sudan (Reid 91). During this war, Eritrea was able to avoid
more collateral damage with the help of Qatar and managed to restore its diplomatic relationship
with Sudan (Reid 91-2). However, the Eritrean government was also able to reassure the
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Sudanese opposition groups they still had their support (Reid 91-2). This began a time where
relations between Sudan and Eritrea were in a constant state of flux based on the regime
currently in power (Reid 93). Sudan and Ethiopia eventually accused Eritrea of being a
destabilizing force in Africa and in 2003, Sudan arrested many Eritrean nationals and also closed
down centers for Eritreans located in Sudan (Reid 93-4). Sudanese relations with Eritrea
improved with the peace agreement between Sudan and the Eastern Front brokered by Eritrea
(Reid 94-5). The current relationship between Sudan and Eritrea is that of close diplomatic ties
(Reid 95) to the point that Sudan actually banned Eritrean opposition groups from operating
within their borders (Reid 95).
Despite their convoluted history, the Sudanese and Eritrean relationship tends to be more
stable than Eritrea’s rapport with Ethiopia. When Eritrea was fighting for independence from
Ethiopia, Sudan allowed Eritrea to use them as a rear base (Plaut 79). Eritrea and Sudan share a
660-kilometer border that does not require visa checks (Plaut 79). Eritrea has also used eastern
Sudan to smuggle weapons (Plaut 79). Additionally, Eritrea has intelligence running out of
Sudan that keeps an eye on its Eritrean diaspora community, along with the situation Sudan and
South Sudan (Plaut 80). Sudan and Eritrea’s history reflects a complex relationship where
Eritrean refugees are often used as bargaining chips. This constant manipulation impacts their
living standards and their safety. The Eritrean regime continues to watch its emigre communities
in other countries and the nations of Sudan and Ethiopia who have been both allies and enemies.
This historical perspective allows for a greater understanding of what ties Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Sudan together and yet at the same time drives them apart. Their history shows that Eritrea,
Ethiopia and Sudan are tied together through shared struggles and violence, and their shared
history has been influential in establishing long running refugee communities.
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Demographic Similarities between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan
Along with a long-shared history, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea have many demographic
similarities that have contributed to the ease with which refugee communities have formed.
Ethiopia’s main ethnic group is that of the Oromo followed by the Amhara, Somali and Tigrinya
ethnic groups (The World Factbook: Ethiopia.). Eritrea recognizes only nine ethnic groups, but
the main one is that of the Tigrinya (The World Factbook: Eritrea.). The Tigrinya people are
located in Southern Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia, speak the same languages as one other and
have a common heritage, that of the Axumaite people (Al-Mahdi). Their languages share an
alphabet and are of the same language family: Semitic languages (Al-Mahdi). Christian Tigrinya
people are followers of the Orthodox Coptic Church and there are a large number of Muslims in
both Eritrea and Ethiopia (al-Mahdi).
Additionally, there is an overarching similarity between various cultural aspects like
food, dress music and wedding and mourning customs (al-Mahdi). As former Prime Minister of
Sudan, Al-Saddig Al-Mahdi says, “Since the sixties of the twentieth century, events have
increased interchange between peoples of the Horn of Africa in an unprecedented way,
particularly in terms of refugees, and sanctuary for opposition movements” (al-Mahdi).
According to Estifanos Gebremedhin, the head of the legal and protection department at the
Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, “‘We are the same people, we share the same
blood, even the same grandfathers’” (Jeffrey). Even though there is a shared background
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, their history of conflict is hard to overcome, “‘People recognize
the shared culture and ethnic background, and that helps for many things, but there’s still distrust
because of the 30-year-war [for independence], and mostly due to 1998-2000 border conflict and
related mass displacement…” (Jeffrey). This cultural similarity contributes to the reasons
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Eritrean refugees choose to flee to Ethiopia and Sudan. There is already a long-shared history
with a community that has put down roots and established themselves. Refugees who choose to
come to Ethiopia and Sudan will be somewhat familiar with the various cultural practices of their
new home. These cultural links provide some reassurance in a tumultuous situation. In addition
to the shared cultural ties, Sudan and Ethiopia have both legislated policies to ensure the
protection of refugees, however, there is still much that remains to be changed to ensure the
safety of Eritrean refugees.
Legislation on Refugees and Life in the Camps
Sudanese Legislation and Refugee Camps
Now that the history of Eritrea and Sudan’s relationship is understood, it is possible to
dive deeper into the Eritrean refugee community that exists currently in Sudan. As of 2018, there
are believed to be around 103,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers (“The World Factbook:
Sudan.”). Sudan has always been an attractive option for Eritrean refugees due to the shared
ethnic groups and seasonal job opportunities (Smock 451). Kassala, Gedaref and Port Sudan are
major cities that are near the border (Johnson 1). The Kassala region in Sudan hosts many
Eritrean refugees and has a long history of doing so (Kuhlman 1). The first major influx of
Eritrean refugees came in 1967, and due to the size of the population, they established an area for
refugees at Qalaa en-Nahal (Kuhlman 48-9). The composition of Eritrean refugees has changed
since refugees have first begun coming to Sudan. Before 1975, when the civil war with Ethiopia
was continuing, refugees were usually from rural areas, and they were of lower economic classes
(Smock 453). Additionally, the majority of refugees were located in rural areas (Smock 453).
After 1975, when fighting increased, refugees began to disperse more even between urban and
rural centers (Smock 453). Eritreans are able to get across the border into Ethiopia and Sudan
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due to high ranking governmental officials smuggling people out of Eritrea (Plaut 154).2 Around
5,000 Eritreans choose to leave Eritrea every month (Stevis and Parkinson). Due to the number
of people fleeing, there are direct and indirect legal structures in Sudan to help settle Eritrean
refugees.
During the Civil War, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front created an organization
aimed at helping displaced Eritreans called the Eritrean Relief Association (Smock 457). This
association was centrally focused on helping Eritreans still in Eritrea, but they were slightly
concerned with Eritreans in Sudan (Smock 457). And yet, they did not want to help too much as
they were concerned that if the situation in Sudan became too comfortable, the Eritreans who
resided there would not return home (Smock 457). Sudan, on the other hand, has several foreign
policies in place for refugees. In 1974, they passed the Sudanese Asylum Act which defines
refugees as “people fleeing their country as a result of political national or religious oppression”
(Kuhlman 50-51). This legislation is actually more liberal than most other countries’ refugee
laws (Kuhlman 51). Refugees must register once they enter the country, and from then on, they
are viewed as a refugee until their application to obtain the status as refugee is rejected (Kuhlman
51). This ensures that bureaucratic delays do not endanger anyone who is fleeing (Kuhlman 51).
Despite its liberalism, the Sudanese legislation gives the government the right to place the
refugees anywhere (Kuhlman 51). This clause and the difficulty in becoming registered, prevents
many Eritrean refugees from registering, which in turn prevents them from working and going to
school (Kuhlman 51). Additionally, Sudan does not allow for a refugee’s involvement in any
activities that are political in nature (Nobel 21). Refugees are also not allowed to leave the

2

A key figure is reported to be General Teklai Kifle Manjus who runs the Eritrean border force (Plaut 154). He smuggles people
the same route that he uses to smuggle weapons (Plaut 154). This is not done because he wants to help Eritreans across the
border, instead he charges exorbitant fees for people who wish to flee (Plaut 155).
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locality where the Sudanese government has placed them (Nobel 21). The Sudanese Asylum Act
also allows for the detention of refugees (Nobel IV), although Sudan has ratified the Convention
Relating to the Status of the Refugees of 1951, and the Organization of African Unity’s
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa of 1969 (Nobel 8).
Yet, the Refugee Convention was not created with Africa in mind and thus was not particularly
helpful (Nobel 8).
The Organization of African Unity’s Convention supplemented the United Nations
Refugee Convention (Nobel 9). The OAU convention strengthens the definition of territorial
asylum laid out in the UN’s convention (Nobel 11). Additionally, it provides for temporary
asylum and security for the refugees (Nobel 11-13). States must move refugees away from the
country they are fleeing from (Nobel 13). One caveat: this applies to permanent refugee camps
and not to transit camps (Nobel 13). Most significantly, just because there are laws protecting
Eritrean refugees does not mean that Sudan has the economic or political ability to act on them.
Sudan does not have the economic ability to meet the needs of their refugees (Assal 11).
Additionally, since the 1960s the Sudanese government has not tried to integrate Eritrean
refugees into their society (Assal 13). Even though Sudan has established these various laws and
institutions aimed at protecting refugees, they still face many hardships and concerns about their
future. Despite Sudan’s laws on the status of refugees, they do not have the means to support
their own citizens, let only refugees who have fled to them for protection.
Ethiopian Legislation and Refugee Camps
Even though Eritrea and Ethiopia have had a complicated conflict-laden history, Ethiopia
still takes in Eritrean refugees and has a variety of reasons to do so. This is in part due to their
shared history and culture, but also due to their belief that hosting these refugees will be
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beneficial to them in the future (Jeffrey). There is also the benefit of financial incentives from
hosting refugees and the hope that their hosting of refugees will distract the world from their own
on-going human rights abuses (Jeffrey). Ethiopia’s legislation on refugees is similar to Sudan’s.
Ethiopia’s government is a signatory for all United Nations’ refugee conventions and protocols
as well as the African Union’s conventions and protocols (Arega 94). In Ethiopia, Eritrean
refugees receive asylum on a prima facie basis (Getachew). Since the border war that ended in
2000, Ethiopia has enacted an open border policy on Eritrean refugees (Getachew). Despite these
policies, Ethiopia is difficult to reach. The Eritrean-Ethiopian border is highly militarized on
both the Eritrean and Ethiopian sides (Getachew). When fleeing from Eritrea into Ethiopia,
Eritrean border guards routinely shoot people (Alfred). Additionally, the regional terrain is
difficult to cross (Getachew). Eritreans who are debating about fleeing do not have access to
information regarding the journey or the situation that refugees face in Ethiopia (Getachew).
Currently, it is believed that there around 167,000 Eritrean refugee and asylum seekers in
Ethiopia (“The World Factbook: Ethiopia.”), and many of them are children (Plaut 165).
Additionally, around 45,000 Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers are also present in Ethiopia
(“The World Factbook: Ethiopia.”). There are Eritrean refugee communities in Ethiopia based in
Afar and Shire (Plaut 164). There are also refugee camps located in the north of Ethiopia
(“15,000 Eritrean Refugees…”). In total there are four refugee camps in the north of Ethiopia
and two refugee camps in the north-eastern part of Ethiopia (Arega 93).
A study in the Shimelba Refugee camp in Ethiopia found that refugees within the camp
worried about several major issues: concern for the future and those they left behind: lack of
social support; lost jobs; privacy and health care access; and fear of legal procedures (Arega
100). Not all is well in these refugee camps, as was clear back in 2013 when there were riots in
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the Adi Harush and Mai Aini refugee camps where protestors were alleging corruption and anger
at the inability to be resettled internationally (Jeffrey).
Around 8,000 Eritrean refugees are living and working in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa, and these programs have proven to work to ensure that Eritreans do not try to migrate to
Europe or Israel (Plaut 166). There is also the Adi-Harush refugee camp located near the Simien
Mountains, which is known for being the starting point for fleeing to Europe (Stevis and
Parkinson). The most recent refugee camp which opened in 2013, is in the Tigray National
Regional State in northern Ethiopia which is called the Hitsats refugee camp (Getachew). A
significant number of Eritrean refugees from the Hitsats refugee camp are leaving and use
smugglers to get out of Ethiopia (Getachew). Ethiopia has begun to move refugees further inland
in Ethiopia and is averaging around 100 people a day (“15,000 Eritrean Refugees…). In contrast
to the Eritreans living in Addis Ababa, there is no employment or opportunity for education for
those who live in refugee camps so many have decided to try the journey to Europe (Plaut 165).
Refugees in Ethiopia are not given work permits so they are not able to hold jobs (Getachew).
Ethiopia has responded to this by allowing some Eritreans to live outside of these camps (Plaut
166). They have also begun to allow a minority of Eritreans to study at universities (Plaut 166).
Even though Ethiopia has legislation concerning refugees, it does not go far enough to ensure
their protection and integration into the greater Ethiopian society. Eritreans in these camps face
many hardships that force them to consider fleeing to Europe to try to seek a better life, even
with these laws and institutions already in place that are supposed to protect them.
Conclusion
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan have a shared cultural identity, history, and legacy of
colonialism. They have created laws and policies to enforce and protect migration, and yet, there
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appears to be no end in sight for the safe migration of Eritreans. Their government is resistant to
change, and for as long as they continue to violate their citizens’ human rights, Eritreans will
continue to flee. The Horn of Africa faces many current and future problems, especially relating
to human rights and migration. While Sudan and Ethiopia have tried to help the fleeing Eritreans
by establishing various laws and protections, their support is fickle and dependent on the moods
of their political leaders, leaving Eritreans vulnerable for exploitation. The various laws that are
aimed at protecting refugees do not do enough to protect this population. It appears that Eritrea
will continue to lose its population, and eventually it may become a state with no people inside
its borders.
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